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ABSTRACT
Affirmative action policies in higher education are used in many countries to try to socially advance
historically disadvantaged minorities. Although the underlying social objectives of these policies are
rarely criticized, there is intense debate over the actual impact of such preferences in higher education
on educational performance and labor outcomes. Most of the work uses U.S. data where clean performance
indicators are hard to find.
Using a remarkably detailed dataset on the 2008 graduating class from an elite engineering institution
(EEI) in India we evaluate the impact of affirmative action policies in higher education on minority
students focusing on three central issues in the current debate: targeting, catch up, and mismatch. In
addition, we present preliminary evidence on labor market discrimination. We find that admission
preferences effectively target minority students who are poorer than the average displaced non-minority
student. Moreover, by analyzing the college performance of minority and non-minority students as
they progress through college, we find that scheduled caste and scheduled tribe students, especially
those in more selective majors, fall behind their same-major peers which is the opposite of catching
up. We also identify evidence in favor of the mismatch hypothesis: once we control for selection into
majors, minority students who enrol in more selective majors as a consequence of admission preferences
end up earning less than if they would have had if they had chosen a less selective major. Finally, although
there is no evidence of discrimination against minority students in terms of wages, we find that scheduled
caste and scheduled tribe students are more likely to get worse jobs, even after controlling for selection.
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Aﬃrmative action (AA) policies in higher education are used in many countries to try to socially
advance historically disadvantaged groups. Although the underlying social objectives of these
policies are rarely criticized, there is intense debate over the actual impact of minority preferences
in higher education on educational performance and labor outcomes. The debate has mainly
focused on three issues: targeting, mismatch, and catch up.
It is well known that family income is a strong predictor of performance. Thus, there is
great concern about the fairness of targeting based on race, ethnicity, or caste rather than on
income. If admission preferences only allow richer students within the minority group to traverse
the (lower) hurdles required for admission, then they may be displacing poor students from the
non-minority or general group. This is also called the “creamy layer problem” in India.
The second issue is catch up. Students admitted to college under preferences often start
oﬀ far behind those admitted under regular admission criteria. But how does the gap between
these two groups change as both progress through college? Do they catch up or fall further
behind? If those admitted under preferences can catch up, even part of the way, then the case
for preferences is clearly stronger than if they fall further behind.
Opponents of AA also claim that the actual gains for the intended beneﬁciaries of the policy
may not exist. In the extreme case, minority students may even be worse oﬀ if they are unpre-
pared for the academic environment they obtain access to through the policy. This argument is
known as the mismatch hypothesis: students who do not qualify for ordinary admission would
do better if they enroled at schools and/or majors which are more in line with their credentials.
If there is severe mismatch, then preferences may even do more harm than good.
Most of the studies to date are narrowly focused on the eﬀects of AA on U.S. minorities’
college performance and labor outcomes. The U.S., we think, is a poor setting in which to
look for such evidence. In most U.S. higher education settings, selection criteria are relatively
nebulous. While institutions do want good students, they pay attention to much more than
grades or SAT scores in deciding whom to admit.1 SAT scores, extracurricular activities, essays,
1This is partly explained by a large number of people having close to or perfect SAT scores. The best schools
could easily ﬁll their seat with only such candidates. However, based on the U.S. experience, there is reason to
believe that this would result in a worse entering class (Blau et al., 2004 and Bowen and Bok, 1998).
1alumni ties, interviews, the perceived likelihood of the student coming2 and donations all matter.
Moreover, AA policies in the U.S. are themselves relatively nebulous: even in their heyday,
they basically consisted of adding some “points” for race. There were rarely quotas or large
and well documented diﬀerences in admission standards.3 Finally, American students have a
huge amount of choice over courses while in college. For example, if smart/serious students take
harder courses where good grades are more diﬃcult to obtain, while poor students take the “gut”
courses where an A- is ensured with minimal eﬀort, then grades may provide little information
on actual academic performance. Recent work by Arcidiacono et al., 2011 that controlling for
selection into majors virtually eliminates any convergence in the black-white performance gap
in college. For all these reasons, the U.S. may not be the best place to evaluate the eﬀects of
AA.
We argue that other countries, with transparent selection criteria and rigid course structure,
provide much more fertile ground for evaluating the eﬀect of AA policies on minority students.
The evidence presented here is particularly important due to its focus on India, which provides
a better setting than the U.S. In India, admission criteria are clear: performance in an open
admission exam or in the school leaving exam is all that matters. Moreover, admission pref-
erences imposed by AA in India are far greater than the ones given to African American or
Hispanic applicants in the U.S. India has very strict and binding quotas in higher education
in favor of scheduled castes (SC) and scheduled tribes (ST). These groups include what were
known as the “untouchable” castes, which used to be relegated to the most menial occupations,
as well as tribal populations who were isolated from the mainstream and often treated as badly
as the SC.4 The quotas result in very large diﬀerences in admission standards, which provide a
nice natural experiment.5 Thus, it is not likely that the empirical results for the Indian case are
confounded by the program being a marginal one. Our focus on India also helps us overcome
2Admissions oﬃcers are often rewarded on the basis of acceptance rates.
3The Texas top 10% law, which guaranteed admission to the top 10% of graduates from all Texas high schools
to any state or public University may be one of the few exceptions. See the Texas Higher Education Opportunity
Project (THEOP) for more on this. The law was loosened in June 2010.
4Lower castes in India represent a greater share in total population than any minority in the U.S. Even if we
only consider the most disadvantaged castes, SC and ST, their 22.5% share surpasses the 13% share of African
Americans in the U.S.
5In fact, the quotas are so much in favor of these disadvantaged groups that even with huge diﬀerences in
admissions cutoﬀs, some elite schools are not able to ﬁll their quotas.
2selection problems present in U.S. college data. Most higher education institutions in India have
a very strict curriculum which minimizes the issue of self selection into easier courses. In this
setting, grades are a very good indicator of college performance.
Using detailed data on the 2008 graduating class from an elite engineering institution (EEI)
in India, this article tries to cast some light on the eﬀects of AA on Indian minorities. In
particular, we look at income and grade distributions of minority and non-minority students
at the EEI to provide some basic evidence on targeting. We ﬁnd that SC/ST students are in
general poorer than other students at the EEI. Using a supplementary data set with information
on entrance exam scores, caste and place of residence for all the applicants to a group of elite
engineering colleges in India in 2009, we show that AA seems to be eﬀectively targeting minority
students who are poorer than the average displaced general (GE) student. By analyzing the
college performance of minority and non-minority students as they progress through college, we
ﬁnd no evidence of catch up: SC and ST students, especially those in more selective majors,
actually seem to fall behind their same-major peers.
We also test the mismatch hypothesis using labor market outcomes and students’ self re-
ports on emotional and social well-being while at the EEI. Without controlling for selection into
selective and non-selective majors, it looks like students in more selective majors earn more.
Propensity score matching methods that control for selection in observables reduce the esti-
mated eﬀect of major selectivity on wages, though it remains positive and signiﬁcant for general
students. However, if the wage and selection equations are jointly estimated to take into account
the role of unobservables, the positive eﬀect among general students goes away, suggesting it was
driven by selection. In other words, general students earn more and choose more selective majors
because they are better in terms of unobservables. Even more interesting, minority students in
more selective majors end up earning signiﬁcantly less than their same-race counterparts in less
selective majors, which supports the mismatch hypothesis. We also identify some evidence in
favor of social mismatch: even after controlling for selection, being enroled in a more selective
major increases stress levels and feelings of not belonging among SC/ST students but the eﬀect
goes in the other direction among general students.
Although there is no evidence that wages are lower for SC/ST students once selection,
3grades, and background characteristics are controlled for, we conclude by asking whether labor
market discrimination may be operating in more subtle ways. We ﬁnd preliminary evidence of
discrimination against minority students in terms of the types of jobs they are able to ﬁnd once
they graduate from the EEI. Controlling for selection into majors and grades, SC/ST students
are less likely to get placed in highly rewarded jobs in the areas of ﬁnances and management
consulting. This could be due to choices made by the students themselves, in which case the
implications of this pattern are benign. For example, if SC/ST students are more risk averse,
they may choose a job based on their core competence that pays less but that is more secure
than one in ﬁnance.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sketches out the major ﬁndings in the
literature so far. Much of this work is on the U.S. and is plagued by data problems. Section 3
describes the EEI context and the reservation policies mandated by the Indian government in
higher education admissions. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the evidence we
have put together on targeting, catch up, mismatch, and discrimination. Section 6 concludes
and describes the limitations of the study, as well as directions for future research.
2 The Evidence to Date
AA policies are meant to help historically disadvantaged minorities. However, if only richer
students within the minority group beneﬁt from AA preferences, displacing poor students from
the advantaged group, the fairness of the policy comes under scrutiny. In the U.S., for example,
the use of race as a proxy for income when targeting the poor has been strongly questioned
over the last decade. The current debate focuses on a shift from race-based to economic-based
aﬃrmative action policies as proposed by Kahlenberg (1996, 2004) among others. Even though
it is true that racial diversity has increased in top colleges in the U.S., income inequality may
have increased as competition to get in has, by all accounts, intensiﬁed. Carnevale and Rose
(2003) ﬁnd that 74% of the students at the top 146 colleges in the U.S. came from families in the
richest economic quarter while only 3% came from the least advantaged quarter. There is also
some indication that AA policies that favor African Americans have disproportionately beneﬁted
richer minority students. At the 28 selective colleges studied by Bowen and Bok (1998), 86% of
4African Americans were middle or upper class students.
In India, however, work by Bertrand et al. (2010) suggests that aﬃrmative action success-
fully targets ﬁnancially disadvantaged students applying to engineering colleges. Even though
caste-based targeting did not beneﬁt the poorest SC/ST students, admission was successfully
reallocated from richer to poorer households. In particular, upper-caste applicants displaced by
AA were richer than the lower-caste applicants taking their place.
Besides targeting, two related issues plague the debate on the appropriateness of AA policies:
catch up and mismatch. In India, where quotas in some states reach 50% of college admissions,
a large burden comes from the expected negative eﬀect on the average quality of students
graduating from higher education institutions. If colleges are forced to admit students from
scheduled castes until the quota is met, large reductions in students’ average ability are expected.
The magnitude of these reductions will be determined not only by the level of the quota, but
by the initial diﬀerences in performance between general and minority students (Kochar, 2010).
However, if minority students catch up while in college, this particular cost of AA policies can
be greatly reduced. Alon and Tienda (2007) evaluate the 10% rule in Texas (where the top 10%
of the graduating class in public high schools was ensured admission to UT Austin) and argue
that the likelihood of graduation rose after the policy was implemented, and did so signiﬁcantly
for blacks. Their evidence is consistent with previous studies that ﬁnd that those admitted
under the top 10% rule outperform those who were admitted with a lower class rank but higher
SAT scores, suggesting that SAT scores are not a good indicator of college performance and
that there may well be considerable catch up. However, Alon and Tienda’s (2007) results are
far from conclusive if those admitted from worse schools were less prepared for college and are
likely to choose less challenging majors. If this is the case, graduation rates per se may be less
than fully informative. Sander (2004) ﬁnds that the average performance gap between blacks
and whites at selective law schools is large and, more importantly, tends to get larger as both
groups progress through college. He also ﬁnds that boosting black applicants into more selective
schools lowers their probability of graduation mostly though reduced grades.
It is clear that minority students targeted by AA policies have initial academic credentials
that are signiﬁcantly weaker than those of their non-minority peers. If minority students are not
5able to close the gap, AA policies that allow them into more selective colleges and/or majors may
end up hurting them. If minority students attending more selective schools due to AA policies
obtain lower grades than the ones they would have obtained in less selective environments, their
labor market outcomes could be worsened by admission preferences.
Attempts to empirically evaluate the “mismatch hypothesis” in the U.S. provide mixed evi-
dence. Rothstein and Yoon (2009) and Sander (2004) ﬁnd evidence of mismatch in law school.
Loury and Garman (1993, 1995) ﬁnd that blacks in the U.S. get considerable earning gains from
attending more selective schools but these gains are oﬀset for black students by lower perfor-
mance both in terms of grades and probability of graduation. Alon and Tienda (2005) assess the
eﬀect of college selectivity on the graduation probability. Using both propensity score matching
methods as well as bivariate probit models, they reject the mismatch hypothesis suggesting that
blacks and Hispanics in the U.S. are able to catch up. We must keep in mind though that U.S.
colleges tend to have low performance graduation requirements so that graduation rates may
not be a good measure of academic success. Arcidiacono (2005) estimates a structural model
that incorporates application decisions, admission decisions, attendance decisions and future
earnings. He argues that removing aﬃrmative action reduces the presence of minority students,
especially in top schools, but it does not aﬀect income or college attendance by much.
Bertrand et al. (2009) is one of the ﬁrst studies analyzing the mismatch hypothesis in India.
They ﬁnd that the marginal eﬀect of caste-based admission preferences in Indian engineering
colleges is positive for minority students: i.e., they do earn more as a result. However, they gain
less than what the students they displace lose. Though their data is better than ours as they
have information on accepted and rejected students, they have no information on grades, which
account for a large part of the diﬀerences in earnings. At the very least, their results are unable
to distinguish between the pure gains from graduating from more selective institutions and the
loss arising from poorer grades in these institutions.
3 Admission Process and Reservation Policies
Admissions to undergraduate programs and some graduate programs oﬀered by the EEI are
conducted through a national examination that is also used by other engineering colleges. The
6admission process is very competitive both because of the diﬃculty of the open competitive
exam and the high number of test takers. The undergraduate acceptance rate is less than 1 in
60: over 300,000 annual test takers compete for 5500 seats in undergraduate programs.
The entrance exam tests the candidate’s knowledge of 3 subjects: Chemistry, Mathematics
and Physics. After the exam is administered, the average of the marks scored by all candidates
is computed for each of the three subjects. These averages give the Minimum Qualifying Marks
(MQM) for Ranking in each subject. All students above the MQM in each subject are ranked in
terms of their aggregate score to construct a common merit list. This merit list contains as many
students as the number of seats available in all undergraduate and graduate programs oﬀered by
the colleges that use the exam for admission. The aggregate score of the last candidate admitted
from this list gives the general cut-oﬀ score for admission.
Although minority students take the exam with the rest of the students, India’s law enti-
tles them to preferences. In traditional Hindu society, caste is hereditary and it used to be
occupation-speciﬁc. Thus, lower caste individuals were trapped in less attractive occupations,
both in terms of prestige and wages. Although reservation policies in India were ﬁrst applied
in labor markets, they soon appeared in higher education as a way to reduce the inequalities
generated and perpetuated by the caste system (see Bertrand et al., 2009). After independence
from Britain, all central government higher education funded institutions were mandated to
comply with reservation requirements for traditionally disadvantaged castes. In particular, the
central government requires that 15% of the students admitted to universities must be from SC
while 7.5% have to come from ST, reﬂecting their share of the general population.6
To comply with the aﬃrmative action policies imposed in higher education admissions, the
EEI has implemented caste-based reserved quotas since 1973. After the common merit list is
constructed, separate merit lists for SC and ST candidates are prepared. If the number of
candidates in each minority list is at least 1.4 times the number of seats available for that caste,
the merit list contains all these candidates. If the number of qualiﬁed minority candidates is less
6Reservations for other backward classes (OBC) were recommended in 1978 and implemented in 1989 in private
unaided institutions as well as high-end government jobs for minority communities. The EEI we analyze did not
make any changes to its reservations policy until 2008. Since then, OBCs have also been provided with a 27%
reservation, although their share in India’s population is about 50%. However, it has been argued that the OBC
group is not “backward” and some privileged castes have made it on to this list.
7than 1.4 times the number of available SC or ST seats, the general admission cut-oﬀ is reduced
by up to 50 percentage points to get the number of candidates as close as possible to 1.4 times
the number of seats. Thus, if the general cutoﬀ is 97%, the SC/ST cutoﬀ could be as low as
47%. However, even after extreme relaxation of the cut-oﬀ scores for minority students, the
aggregate quota of 22.5% for SC and ST students is not always met.7
Each program at the EEI or at any other higher education institution that uses the centralized
exam to regulate admissions oﬀers a ﬁxed number of seats for general, OBC, SC, and ST
students. Once a student qualiﬁes into the relevant merit list, she submits a preference ranking
over majors and colleges. Within each merit list, exam scores can be thought of as bids for a
particular program. Placement is oﬀered until the reserved number of seats for a caste group
is ﬁlled or until all applicants in the corresponding merit list are placed. Ex-post, this system
generates major and caste speciﬁc cut-oﬀ scores. More prestigious majors with higher salaries in
the labor market tend to be more competitive and hence have higher exam cut-oﬀ scores for both
general and minority students. This allocation process generates assortative matching within
each major: top students from the general group are matched with top students in the minority
group. However, as the quotas are major by major and the aggregate quota is not ﬁlled, SC/ST
students are more likely to be in selective majors so that the diﬀerence in performance between
SC/ST and general students tends to be greatest in selective majors. Note that once at the
EEI all students are evaluated under the same criteria both in terms of grades and graduation
requirements though SC/ST students usually take longer to graduate.
4 Data
The sample of students used in this study corresponds to the graduating class of 2008 from
an EEI, which includes 354 Bachelor students and 97 Dual Degree students.8 The data set
contains institutional records and some background information obtained from an exit survey
administered to all graduating students.9 The institutional records contain data on GPA and
7Since 2008, a separate merit list is also constructed for OBC students. However, the relaxation in marks
applied to the admission cut-oﬀ for this group is at most 10%.
8Dual degrees programs integrate undergraduate and postgraduate studies in selected areas of specialization.
They are completed in ﬁve years, only one more year compared to conventional Bachelor’s degrees.
9The survey was only administered in 2008.
8number of credits completed at the EEI on a semester by semester basis, as well as some basic
information on the students such as gender, caste, age, and major. Additionally, the exit survey
data provides information on previous schooling, family income, land, and property ownership,
parents’ and siblings’ educational levels and occupations, expenditures in coaching to prepare
for the admission exam, as well as some information about placement, such as type of job and
ﬁrst salary after graduation. The survey also collects detailed information on academic life
experience, hostel life at the EEI10, and extracurricular activities.
A major limitation of the data is that it does not include students’ scores in the entrance
exam as a pre-college performance measure. However, this problem can be partly circumvented
by using the cumulative GPA (CGPA) of the student at the end of the ﬁrst year in the EEI. This
is a good proxy for the exam score because the courses taken during the ﬁrst year of Bachelor’s
and Dual Degree programs share a common structure across majors and the material covered
closely reﬂects the material evaluated through the exam.11 However, there is anecdotal evidence
that some students slack oﬀ in the ﬁrst year. In what follows, we deﬁne major selectivity based
on students’ average performance in the major in the ﬁrst year. According to this criterion,
Bachelor’s programs in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering (Power) as well as dual
degrees in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering are “selective” majors.12
The second data limitation is the large number of students with missing values in one or
more of the variables obtained from the survey. Only 56% of the sample has complete data
for all the 31 variables we use. Almost 36% of the students have missing values in one or two
variables, and the remaining 8% of the sample has between 3 and 14 variables with missing
values. As column 1 in Table A.1 in Appendix A shows, most of the variables have missing
values for a few individuals. The variables with the greatest percentage of missing data points
are wages after graduation and type of school attended but even in these cases the problem is
not severe. To avoid dropping variables or observations, we rely on multiple random imputation
methods to generate an imputed complete data set. Assuming the data is missing at random,
a common assumption in most imputations methods, the completed data set is obtained using
10Throughout their stay in the EEI, students live in hostels located in campus.
11Common courses usually include basic Electronics, Mechanics, Chemistry, and Physics.
12See Table C.1 in Appendix C.
9sequential generalized regression models. A complete description of the procedures used is given
in Appendix B.
We also rely on a supplementary database on the scores of the universe of applicants who
took the centralized entrance exam used for admission to the EEI in 2009 (384,977 students).
These records were obtained from the exam organizer’s website in September 2010. In addition
to each applicant’s aggregate score and scores by subject, the records contain information on
the caste and place of residence as indicated by the All India Postal Index Number (PIN).
Using the PIN code identiﬁers, we merged the exam applicant data with district level poverty




AA policies are usually implemented for two main reasons. First, governments may directly
target minority groups pursuing objectives related to diversity, social harmony, and social ad-
vancement of historically excluded groups. Second, race (or caste in India) can be a substitute
for income to target social interventions. As mentioned above, minority groups in India have
been historically trapped in less prestigious occupations with lower wages. Consequently, the
government adopted caste-based targeting policies as a substitute for income-based targeting
policies with the hope that the former was a more eﬃcient way to identify disadvantaged groups
as backward caste status is harder to falsify than income.14 Verifying income is especially diﬃcult
in India since 92% of the labor force works as informal workers (NCEUS, 2009).
Nevertheless, race or ethnicity-based targeting strategies raise questions about the fairness
of the preferences. Although it is true that the proportion of people below the poverty line
among scheduled castes and tribes is about 50% higher than that among the general category
(see Chakravarty and Somanathan, 2008), a common argument against AA is that low caste
13Poverty data comes from Table A2 in Chaudhuri and Gupta (2009) while data on minority and rural popu-
lation at the district level is obtained from the Indian Census 2001.
14SC/ST status is documented by certiﬁcates issued by the Indian government. Given the widespread income
tax evasion in India, income is likely to be underestimated, especially in non-salaried employment.
10applicants may be far richer than the average low caste household. Even worse, advantaged
minority students may take slots away from poorer students from the non-minority group.
To address targeting issues, one needs to compare the background characteristics of displaced
general students to displacing minority students. Although the data from the the EEI’s 2008
graduating class provides us with detailed background information for admitted EEI students
we do not observe the background characteristics of displaced general students who were not
admitted in 2003 or 2004. Nevertheless, Figures 1 and 2 provide some evidence in our data on
the existence of a creamy layer eﬀect at the EEI resulting from minority quotas.
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Source: Survey data from the EEI’s graduating class, 2008.
Figure 1 shows that minority students admitted to the EEI are on average poorer than
students from the general category (non SC/ST). However, there are a few lower caste students
who come from advantaged backgrounds. If we look at the mean CGPA on entrance and at
graduation, we notice that, on average, these “advantaged” students from the “disadvantaged”
group have much higher CGPAs both in the ﬁrst year and in the remaining periods. While there
is at best a weak positive link between CGPA and family income for general students, there is a
clear jump in CGPA for higher income minority students. Rich SC/ST students perform much
like their counterparts in the general category, while poor ones look very diﬀerent, suggesting
11that it is the interaction of poverty and SC/ST status that is most harmful.
Figure 2 is consistent with this insight. Panel (a) shows that higher income students from
the general group have slightly higher average grades. However, both ﬁrst order and second
order stochastic dominance of the distribution of richer general students is rejected. Panel (b)
in Figure 2 shows that high income students among the SC/ST have much higher grades than
low income ones. In addition, while the general category has some rich students with poor
GPAs, the SC/ST does not. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov type test cannot reject the null of second
order dominance of the grade distribution for rich SC/ST students over that for poorer minority
students, which is consistent with the higher mean and lower dispersion for the rich observed
by eyeballing the data.
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Source: Survey data from the EEI’s graduating class, 2008.
Results from a regression of initial CGPA on income, caste, and controls conﬁrm that the
interaction between high income (above 9 lacs) and SC/ST is still positive and signiﬁcant even
after adding additional regressors and despite very few SC/ST students in the highest income
group (see Table C.2). These results conﬁrm the evidence presented above: poor minority
students start oﬀ lagging behind general and rich minority students.
To summarize, better-oﬀ minority students who beneﬁt from caste-based preferences repre-
12sent a very small proportion of all the SC/ST students admitted into the EEI (see histogram in
Figure 1) and they look like students in the general category. These two facts suggest that the
extent of the creamy layer problem at the EEI might be small. However, we must keep in mind
that we are only comparing admitted students across income groups and caste and we know
nothing about general applicants who are not placed due to the minority preferences.
Fortunately, we can learn more about targeting by using the 2009 entrance exam applicant
database (see Appendix D for more details on district-level patterns identiﬁed in the 2009 ap-
plicant data). As described in Section 3, admission through the centralized entrance exam is a
deterministic function of the student’s score and caste. Within their caste, students are ranked
according to their exam score and only those above a caste-speciﬁc threshold make it into their
group’s merit list. Descending through the caste-speciﬁc score ranking, students in each merit
list are progressively placed until all available seats for that caste are ﬁlled or until all students
in the merit list are placed. Given this system, we can evaluate the targeting properties of the
AA policy. A basic test would be to compare the economic background of minority students
admitted under the preferences (“displacing” students) to that of students who are denied a
seat but who would have been accepted in the absence of the preferences (“displaced students”).
If displacing students are less advantaged than displaced students we can conclude that AA is
redistributing resources to relatively poorer students.
As mentioned before, the 2009 applicant data lacks of data on ﬁnal college placement. How-
ever, we approximate displaced and displacing groups using the information on the students in
each caste-speciﬁc merit list as well as the number of seats available for each caste group. In
2009, all colleges using the centralized exam to regulate admission oﬀered 8295 seats.15 Out of
these seats, 4784 were assigned to general students, while 1594, 1282, and 635 were reserved for
OBC, SC, and ST students, respectively. We construct the displaced GE group with all general
students who would have obtained a seat in a college (including the EEI) if the 8295 seats were
allocated without caste-speciﬁc preferences. These are general students who made it into the
common merit list but who were ranked worse than the 4784th general student in this list and
so ended up without a seat. The displacing SC/ST group consists of two groups: i) SC students
15Additionally, 251 seats were reserved for students with physical disabilities but since we do not have these
applicants in the applicant data we exclude them from the analysis.
13who did not qualify into the common merit list but who are better ranked than the 1282nd
student within the SC merit list and ii) ST students who did not qualify into the common merit
list but who are better ranked than the 635th student within the ST merit list. In 2009, 93%
(92%) of the SC (ST) applicants in the SC (ST) merit list are displacing students.16
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Assuming that neither the number of applicants in each caste nor the number of seats
available would change in the absence of the AA policy, we can compare district poverty rates
across displaced and displacing groups to evaluate the targeting properties of the program.
Figure 3 plots the cumulative distributions of the percentage of poor in urban areas in the
applicants’ districts of residence for both groups. It is clear that displacing minority students
come from poorer districts compared to displaced general students. The null of ﬁrst or higher
order stochastic dominance is rejected, but when rich districts with poverty rates below 4% are
dropped, the distribution of poverty rates of displacing students second order dominates that
of displaced students. This suggests that the use of minority admission preferences at the EEI
is eﬀectively redistributing educational opportunities to students who live in poorer districts.
16Although we might mislabel some applicants due to non-enrolment after placement, we expect this potential
bias to be small. Colleges who allocate seats using this centralized exam are top higher education institutions in
the country so students who are oﬀered a seat in one of them are not very likely to reject it.
14However, lack of individual data on income or consumption in the 2009 applicant database does
not allow us to compare living standards of displacing SC/ST’s households to that of the average
minority household.
5.2 Catch up
The use of minority preferences on college admission in India is justiﬁed by the under-representation
of SC and ST students in higher education institutions. AA policies were introduced as a way
to alleviate the legacy of the caste system and allow SC and ST groups to catch up to the
educational and labor outcomes of upper castes. In turn, opponents of aﬃrmative action argue
that reservation schemes undermine the quality of education since the lack of preparation of
minority students during childhood cannot be amended at such a late stage. They argue that
minority students who beneﬁt from preferential admission start oﬀ college far behind students
accepted under regular criteria and that competition while in college will then translate into
poor performance among SC and ST students.
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In fact, data on test results for the universe of students taking the exam in 2009 reveal a
huge diﬀerence in initial caste-based academic levels. If we look at the distribution of exam
scores in Figure 4, we ﬁnd that SC/ST students account for 22% of those in the lowest decile.
15Moreover, their participation in higher deciles steadily declines and their contribution in the
top decile only reaches 3%. In turn, almost 80% of the students in the top decile come from
the general category. Even more striking is the participation of backward castes in the common
merit list: out of the 8,295 students who made it into the common merit list in 2009, only 78
come from SC while 15 come from ST.
But how is the educational gap between general and SC/ST students changing once at the
EEI? First of all, what do we mean by educational gap? One approach might be to look at
how these two groups fare at the end of their time at the EEI relative to the beginning. Figure
5 compares the cumulative GPA of minority and non-minority students at the end of the ﬁrst
year and by the end of their programs, net of their initial performance. While it is clear that
the distribution of grades among general students always ﬁrst order dominates that of minority
students (a Kolmogorov-Smirnov type test conﬁrms it), a ﬁrst look might lead one to think that
SC/ST students are catching up. For both SC/ST and the GE group, the CGPA distribution
at the end seems to improve relative to that in the ﬁrst year, and more so for minority students.
By this measure, the gap in average CGPA between general and SC/ST students shrinks by
15%.17 But we argue below that this is not comparing like to like as we need to control, at the
very least, for major choices and diﬀerences in grading across majors.
Figure 6 presents the evolution of grades over years by caste. Among general students,
the distribution of grades does not move much over time. However, the distribution of grades
for SC/ST students seems to be improving as time in the EEI goes by. While the gap in
average CGPAs between the ﬁrst and the last year contracts by 10% among general students,
the reduction is close to 15% among minority students.
It is tempting to interpret the evidence in Figures 5 and 6 as preliminary evidence in favor of
catch up, but it is inappropriate to do so without controlling for the major or without taking into
account relative instead of absolute grades. First, if GPAs tend to go up in later semesters, say
because faculty grade more leniently in advanced courses, we could see CGPAs drifting upwards
17Notice that for each time period and caste group, average CGPA is given by the area above the cumulative
distribution. The gap between GE and SC/ST average scores in the ﬁrst year is just the area between the two
solid curves. Similarly, the gap between the two groups at the end of their careers is the area between the dashed
curves. The contraction of the gap in averages scores is just the percentage change in these areas between the
ﬁrst and the last year at the EEI.
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17for all students over time. Moreover, if some majors do more of this than others, and SC/ST
students select into these majors, then we might see the above even if there was no catch up.
Finally, if we are interested in catch up, we should not be looking at the absolute grades, but at
the relative grades within each program. In fact, this is exactly what Arcidiacono et al., 2011
show happens in elite U.S. colleges. Although the gap between white and black GPA falls by
half between the ﬁrst and the last year of college, this comes primarily from switching into easier
majors and smaller variance in grading during later years.
To control for major and relative grades, we look at how students who were in a particular
percentile in terms of ﬁrst year CGPA, relative to all those in their major, fared in terms of their
CGPA after the ﬁrst year, relative to all those in their major. If students who were in the 30th
percentile of their major in terms of their ﬁrst year CGPA are on average in the 40th percentile
in terms of their CGPA in the next 3-4 years of their careers, catch up may be occurring. In turn,
if those students average at the 20th percentile after the ﬁrst year, they are falling back instead
of catching up. Since we are considering how students fare relative to others in their major, we
eliminate the eﬀect of diﬀerent grading standards across majors. Moreover, by considering their
ordinal standing rather than the level of CGPA, we eliminate the eﬀect of diﬀerences in grades
in early versus late semesters.
Panel (a) in Figure 7 plots average major ranks at graduation versus ﬁrst year major ranks
both by caste and major selectivity. Average percentiles at the end are calculated through
separate locally linear regressions within each group.18 Thus, for example, general students in
non-selective majors who were in the 20th percentile of their majors in terms of their ﬁst year
CGPA are, on average, in the 28th percentile of their major at graduation, measured in terms
of their ﬁnal CGPA net of the ﬁrst year.
In general, the curves presented in Panel (a) show that the slope of the ﬁnal average ranking
with respect to the initial ranking is less than unity, especially at the top and bottom. This
is to be expected as those initially at the bottom have no place to go but up and those at the
top have no place to go but down. In other words, reversion to the mean should be present.
18To avoid misleading patterns due to outliers, the ﬁve SC/ST students who ranked above the 50th percentile
in the ﬁrst year are removed. Two of these dropped observations belong to the group of minority students who
have high family income.
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Notes: Bachelor programs in CS and EE Power as well as dual degree programs in CS and EE are classiﬁed as
Selective Majors. Average ﬁnal rankings are locally mean-smoothed using a kernel-weighted local polynomial
smoother.
Nevertheless, in the general category, irrespective of the selectivity of the major, these curves
are very close to the 45 degree line suggesting that, on average, general students stay in the
major-speciﬁc percentiles they start oﬀ in. However, this is not the case for SC/ST students.
Panel (a) shows that the slope for selective and non-selective majors seems to be below one for
minority students and it is even ﬂatter for selective majors, suggesting that SC/ST students are
falling behind over time and more so in more selective majors.
Panel (b) in Figure 7 presents the results of separate regressions by caste and major selectivity
of the ﬁnal major rank on the initial percentile relative to the major. The round marker shows
point estimates of the coeﬃcient of the initial ranking while the vertical line represents the 95%
conﬁdence interval of each coeﬃcient. The estimates conﬁrm the pattern observed in panel (a):
the slope of ﬁnal ranking with respect to the initial ranking is close to one for general students,
and even so for SC/ST students in less selective majors. In fact, we cannot reject the null of
19the coeﬃcient being equal to unity for the latter. In turn, the slope for SC/ST students in more
selective majors is around 0.25 and unity is clearly far outside the conﬁdence interval.
The evidence presented in Figure 7 suggests that the catch up we seemed to ﬁnd in the
aggregate was an illusion. When we look at how SC/ST students do relative to those in their
major over time, a diﬀerent picture emerges. Although minority students in less selective majors
are able to at least keep up, SC/ST students in more selective majors seem to be falling behind
rather than catching up. This is not surprising considering that minority students start college
lagging far behind non-minority students. Consequently, the gap between general and SC/ST
students is likely to increase as both groups progress through college, especially in more selective
majors. Even by running as fast as they can, SC/ST students can hope, at best, to stay in the
same place they started but those in more competitive majors cannot even do this and fall even
further behind their general category peers.
5.3 Mismatch
The evidence so far seems to suggest that minority students are not catching up in terms of
academic performance. On the contrary, SC/ST students in more selective majors tend to fall
behind in their major-speciﬁc rankings as they progress through college. This pattern seems
to be supportive of the mismatch hypothesis, which predicts lower success rates for minority
students who enrol in more selective colleges and/or majors relative to those in colleges and/or
majors where their academic credentials are better matched to the average.
We ﬁrst explore the extent to which AA policies motivate minority students to aim for more
selective majors at the EEI. Figure 8 displays the fractions of general and minority students in
the EEI who are accepted into selective majors as functions of their ﬁrst year CGPA percentile.19
The fraction of students in selective majors at each percentile score is computed from separate
locally linear regressions within each group. Although the fraction of students who attend selec-
tive majors is increasing in initial performance for both general and SC/ST students, minority
students are much more likely to attend selective majors for all levels of ﬁrst year CGPA. This
evidence is consistent with Rothstein and Yoon’s (2009) ﬁndings on school choice for white and
black students in law school and it suggests that the reservation schemes in India are playing a
19Again, the ﬁve minority students above the 50th percentile in terms of ﬁrst year CGPA are dropped.
20signiﬁcant role in the major choice of SC/ST applicants.
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Figure 9 shows preliminary evidence on the eﬀect of minority groups’ preferences towards
more selective majors. In particular, we plot the cumulative distribution of wages at graduation
by caste and major selectivity. It is clear that the distribution of wages for non-minority students
in selective majors ﬁrst order dominates the distribution of wages in all other groups.20 Whether
this is due to ability diﬀerences or whether this is because of high returns to enrolment in more
selective majors, we cannot say yet. Notice that the gap between selective and non-selective
majors seems to be much smaller among minority students than it is among general students.
This could be partially explained by a more intense ability screening for non SC/ST students in
more selective majors. It could also be explained by SC/ST students gaining less from being in
selective majors, i.e., mismatch. However, although SC/ST students do not seem to catch up
while in college, it may still be possible that the preferences on admission translate into higher
wages for those who beneﬁt from the reservations and enter highly selective majors.
20That of the GE category in non selective majors slightly dominates that of the SC/ST group in selective
majors, which is close to that of SC/ST students in non selective majors.
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The rest of this sub section will evaluate the eﬀect of major selectivity on labor market out-
comes for both general and SC/ST students. Since admission is only driven by caste and per-
formance in the centralized entrance exam, the allocation of seats in selective and non-selective
majors is not exogenous with respect to future academic performance and wages. Taking into
account that allocation to selective and non-selective majors is not random, we try to assess the
causal link between major selectivity and ﬁrst wage after graduation.
To evaluate the mismatch hypothesis, we compare the wages of students in selective majors
with their same-caste counterparts in less selective majors. This task requires taking into ac-
count that graduating from a selective major depends on being admitted to that major, which
ultimately depends on ability (maybe partially unobserved) and other individual characteristics
that also determine wages.
Let S∗
i be a latent continuous variable which is increasing in the selectivity of i’s major:
S∗
i = Ziγ − µi
where Zi denotes observed individual characteristics such as gender, ﬁrst year CGPA (proxy for
entrance exam score), family income, father’s education, school type, a dual degree dummy, and
22type of job. Deﬁne Si = 1 if S∗
i ≥ 0 and Si = 0 if S∗
i < 0. Assuming that µi ∼ N(0,σ2
µ), the
probability of being enroled in a selective major is given by:
Pr(S = 1|Zi) = Φ(Ziγ;σ2
µ) (1)
Let w∗
i denote individual i’s log wage at graduation (in logs of lacs):
w∗
i = α1Si + Xiβ1 − ￿i
where Xi is contained in Zi. Our data gives interval data for wages, so we deﬁne a discrete
variable, wi, which will be equal to category Wk if ξk−1 ≤ w∗
i < ξk. We use three wage groups
with known thresholds, ξk, at ξ0 = −∞, ξ1 = log(5), ξ2 = log(7), and ξ3 = ∞. Assuming that
￿i ∼ N(0,σ2
￿), and representing the normal cumulative distribution with mean zero and variance
σ2 by Φ(x;σ2), the probability of wi = Wk is given by:
Pr(wi = Wk|Xi) = Pr(ξk−1 ≤ w∗
i < ξk)
= Φ(α1Si + Xiβ1 − ξk−1;σ2
￿) − Φ(α1Si + Xiβ1 − ξk;σ2
￿) (2)
Our model can be summarized by the system (1)-(2). In particular, the parameter of interest
is α1: if α1 ≤ 0, we cannot reject the mismatch hypothesis for SC/ST students in selective ma-
jors. However, we need to take into account the endogenous selection process that determines
allocation into majors, summarized by (1). Measuring the wage premium of selective majors as
the diﬀerence in wages of students in selective and non-selective majors gives a biased picture:
upward bias is likely since observable and unobservable personal traits that make a student more
likely to get into a selective major also make a student more likely to get higher wages. For ex-
ample, students with higher exam scores, measured by ﬁrst year CGPA, are more likely to be in
selective majors and earn higher wages. If we ignore the role of exam score in selection into ma-
jors, the beneﬁcial eﬀect of major selectivity on wages is overestimated as selective majors have
students with relatively higher scores. If we assume that both ￿i and µi are uncorrelated random
shocks, so that selection into more selective majors is only driven by observables, propensity
score matching techniques yield an unbiased eﬀect of Si on wages. However, if ￿i and µi contain
unobserved traits that increase the probability of being in a more selective major and that of
23getting higher wages, propensity score matching methods yield biased estimates of α1. In this
case, the bias caused by the correlation between ￿i and µi can be prevented by jointly estimating
(1)-(2).
Assuming selection is exclusively driven by observables, we obtain propensity scores (or the
probability of a student being enroled in a selective major) separately for general and minority
students based on their observable characteristics in Xi as well as additional controls such as
coaching expenditures for the entrance exam, number of household members, and age of the
student. We then include the estimated propensity score as an additional regressor in the wage
equation, assuming that enrolment in selective majors is random with respect to wages once we
control for Xi and the propensity score.21
If we also allow selection into selective majors to be related to students’ unobservable char-
acteristics (i.e., ￿i and µi are correlated through unobservables), the system in (1)-(2) must be
jointly estimated. Despite the availability of extensive survey data at the student level, we could
not ﬁnd a good exclusion restriction. Finding an instrument that would only aﬀect the major se-
lectivity equation but not the wage equation was impossible given that the determinants of both
equations overlap a great deal. Therefore, identiﬁcation comes from the normality assumptions
on the error terms.22
Table 1 summarizes our results (see Table C.3 and C.4 for more details). Column 1 provides
a baseline estimate of α1 when the endogeneity of the major choice is ignored and the wage
equation in (2) is estimated including Si and Xi as regressors. Columns 2 provides estimates
based on propensity score matching methods, where the propensity score has been added to
equation (2) as an additional control.
Among general students, being enroled in a more selective major seems to have a positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀect even after controlling for selection on observables. Of course, ˆ α1 is lower
once we control for selection on observables, which is expected if students who enrol in more
selective majors are also more likely to earn higher wages. Propensity score matching methods
21See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Unfortunately, we have interval data on wages. If the outcome variable
were binary or continuous, we could also implement the traditional matching approach which provides a non-
parametric estimator of α1 without making assumptions on the relationship between wages and Xi (or Zi).
22We also experimented with instruments. For the GE group, the results were very similar to those relying
on functional form assumptions. The sample size was too small in the SC/ST group for us to consider using
instruments there.
24Table 1: Eﬀect of Attending a Selective Major at the EEI on Wages ( ˆ α1)
Interval PSb Joint
Regressiona Estimationc
GE 0.185*** 0.176*** 0.115
(0.036) (0.037) (0.149)
ρ = 0.196
SC/ST 0.055 -0.001 -0.380*
(0.085) (0.093) (0.199)
ρ = 0.913
Source: Survey data from the EEI’s graduating class, 2008.




a Coeﬃcient on observed major choice in an interval regression for wages.
b Propensity score included as control in interval regression for wages.
c Joint estimation of selective major choice and wages equations, no instruments.
show that general students in highly competitive majors earn 17% more than their same-caste
peers in less selective majors. Among minority students, this wage premium is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, suggesting that admission preferences that facilitate admission of SC/ST
into selective majors do not increase future wages in this group.
However, these results should not be taken as the ﬁnal word. As mentioned above, if students
with higher unobserved ability tend to choose more selective majors, then controlling for selection
as we have done so far will overestimate the eﬀect of being in a selective major. The results in
the last column of Table 1 show that the estimated correlation in the errors across equations is
positive within each group (general and SC/ST) and, as a result, ˆ α1 falls, becoming insigniﬁcant
for the GE group and signiﬁcantly negative for the SC/ST group. Being in a selective major has
no eﬀect on the earnings of GE students: the wage premium previously identiﬁed for them was
only due to unobserved ability diﬀerences. This is consistent with the work of Altonji et. al.
(2005) in the U.S. on the eﬀect of attending Catholic schools on the probability of graduation.
For the SC/ST group, it suggests mismatch. Minority students who enrol in selective majors as
a consequence of AA policies obtain lower wages than they would have had if they had chosen
a less selective major.23
23A weakness in our estimates is that the estimated ρs, though positive, are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
as we can see from Table 1 above.
25In addition to its eﬀect on wages, being enroled in a more selective major can also aﬀect
minority students’ well-being while at the EEI. Since they see themselves falling behind general
students in the same major they could also be facing higher instantaneous costs of going to college
by being more stressed and frustrated than their same-caste peers in less selective majors.24
We rely on survey data on academic life experience and hostel life to analyze students’ well-
being while in college. In particular, we focus on two survey questions. The ﬁrst one asks the
students if they had ever felt stressed, depressed, lonely, or discriminated at the EEI where the
possible answers are Never, Occasionally, Often and Regularly. We also rely on a question that
asks the student if he or she felt that the hostel was like a home away from home.
Figure 10 reveals important levels of discontent and/or social discomfort which seem to
be higher among minority students, more so in more selective majors. Panels (a)-(d) show
that SC/ST students in more selective majors are more likely to experience some degree of
stress, depression, loneliness, or discrimination compared to their counterparts in easier majors.
Moreover, minority students in the tougher majors are less likely to feel as comfortable as at
home while living in campus hostels (see panel (e)). These patterns do not appear among general
students, where the distribution of the answers seems to be less aﬀected by major selectivity.
Let variable y∗
i be a latent variable that denotes an aspect of student’s well being such as
stress, depression, loneliness, discrimination, or feeling comfortable at campus hostels:
y∗
i = α2Si + Xiβ2 − εi
Deﬁne yi = 1 if y∗
i ≥ 0 and yi = 0 if y∗
i < 0. Assuming that εi ∼ N(0,σ2
ε), the probability of
feeling stressed (depressed, lonely, discriminated, or comfortable at the hostels) is then:
Pr(yi = 1|Xi) = Φ(α2Si + Xiβ2;σ2
ε) (3)
Table 2 reports our estimates of α2.25 Again, we control for selection into more selective
24Table C.5 in Appendix C shows that indeed, students whose ﬁrst year CGPA is below the average performance
in their major seem to be the most emotionally aﬀected as the coeﬃcient on the demeaned ﬁrst year CGPA shows.
25We drop individuals with missing observations in each of the well-being variables. We did not include these
variables in the imputation process because the missing at random assumption is less defendable in these cases.
The problem is small though; missing values in the stress, depression, loneliness, discrimination, or hostel is like
home variables only represent between 6% and 10% of the individuals in each caste.
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(e) Hostel does not feel like home
Source: Survey data from the EEI’s graduating class, 2008.





GE 0.112* 0.125* -0.082***
(0.065) (0.068) (0.010)
ρ=0.85




GE 0.015 0.019 -0.110***
(0.052) (0.053) (0.014)
ρ= 0.86***




GE 0.035 0.042 -0.093*
(0.052) (0.054) (0.049)
ρ = 0.96




GE -0.026 -0.026 -0.096**
(0.043) (0.045) (0.049)
ρ = 0.68**
SC/ST -0.018 -0.018 -0.082
(0.172) (0.212) (0.124)
ρ = 0.56
Hostel does not feel like home
GE -0.016 -0.008 -0.003
(0.057) (0.058) (0.085)
ρ = -0.01
SC/ST 0.155 0.088 0.121***
(0.122) (0.125) (0.036)
ρ=-0.86*
Source: Survey data from the EEI’s graduating class, 2008.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Stress, depression, loneliness, and discrimination dummies are constructed by
coding Often and Regularly as ones. Hostel feels like home dummy is obtained by




a Coeﬃcient on observed major choice in a probit model.
b Propensity score included as control in probit model.
c Joint estimation of selective major choice and well-being equations, no instruments.
28majors using propensity score matching methods and jointly estimating the system (1)-(3).
Once selection into observables and unobservables is taken into account, general students in
more selective majors tend to be slightly happier during their college experience than their
same-race counterparts in less selective majors. The estimated ρs for general students suggest
that more able or motivated students who are more likely to choose tougher majors are also more
likely to face higher levels of emotional discomfort during their college experience.26 Once this
correlation is taken into account, general students in more selective majors are more likely to ﬁt
in socially than non-minority students in less selective majors. However, the story is diﬀerent
for SC/ST students. Compared to minority students in less selective majors, SC/ST students in
tougher majors are signiﬁcantly more stressed and feel less comfortable at the hostel facilities.
Mismatch is not only generating lower wages, but it is also imposing a higher cost of going to
college on them.27
In sum, the results suggest that general students do not beneﬁt from being in selective
majors; they earn more because they are better. However, they do tend to face relatively lower
emotional and social costs of studying at the EEI compared to general students in less selective
majors. Taking unobservables into account shows that SC/ST students in selective majors earn
less than minority students in less selective majors, supporting the mismatch hypothesis. These
students also seem to experience what we call social mismatch as they also feel more stressed
and less comfortable at the campus hostels when compared to SC/ST in less selective majors.
5.4 Discrimination in the Labor Market
In the previous sub-section, we found that SC/ST students in selective majors earn less relative
to minority students in easier majors. However, we cannot tell if minority students are better
oﬀ as a group due to AA in higher education. Lack of an adequate control group or a structural
model impede us to compare minority students’ wages after graduating from the EEI to their
wages in the absence of minority preferences.
Since we know that very few students from the minority group enter the entrance exam’s
common merit list, it is very likely that without minority preferences most SC/ST students
26The exception is the last variable, hostel does not feel like home, where the correlation is very close to zero.
27Social mismatch does not seem to aﬀect wages or grades directly.
29admitted into the EEI would have gone to a worse school - that is, if they even made it into
college. Given that the Indian labor market rewards degrees from better universities with
higher wages, AA beneﬁciaries are expected to be better oﬀ as a group. However, even if SC/ST
students experience gains from attending the EEI, these beneﬁts could be oﬀset by labor market
discrimination. If employers with negative stereotypes against minority students are less likely
to assign workers from that group to highly rewarded jobs, we could observe discrimination in
terms of wages or occupations (Coate and Loury, 1993). Even worse, if employers are aware of
the extent of minority quotas, coming from the SC/ST group could become a negative signal in
the labor market.
Here we provide some basic evidence on discrimination. We evaluate if, conditional on the
admission minority preferences in place, there is discrimination in the workplace. Although we
are aware of the limitations of a regression-based approach that controls for observable diﬀerences
among minority and non-minority students, there is still some informative value in this exercise.
Of course, diﬀerences in unobservable traits across groups can bias our estimates.28
Tables C.3 and C.4 showed that the constant term in the wage equation varies very little by
caste, implying that caste-speciﬁc mean wages net of observables are very close. Indeed, even
after controlling for selection into majors, grades, and type of job we cannot reject the null that
the constant in the wage equation is equal across groups. But what if discrimination operates
in more subtle ways? We ask below whether SC/ST students seem to get what are seen as less
prestigious or upwardly mobile jobs like those in Finance. Of course, this could be (i) because
such jobs are riskier than jobs using their core competencies in engineering and SC/ST students
are risk averse and choose not to go for such jobs in which case the outcome is benign, or (ii)
because employers are giving SC/ST worse jobs.
To test this hypothesis, we measure occupational diﬀerences by caste, conditioning on major
choice and grades. We estimate an ordered probit model where the outcome variable increases as
the job becomes less menial from core and analytical jobs to management/consulting, ﬁnancial,
28See Charles and Guryan (2011) for more details.
30and non-technical positions.29 Let j∗
i be a continuous latent variable increasing in job’s prestige:
j∗
i = α3Si + Xiβ3 − νi
In the data, we ﬁnd 5 job types, ji, where the ﬁrst category are core jobs and the last one
corresponds to non-technical positions. The thresholds between categories, ζk, are unknown and
have to be estimated. Again, we assume that νi ∼ N(0,σ2
ν) so that the probability of getting a
job in category k is:
Pr(ji = Jk|Xi) = Pr(ζk−1 ≤ j∗
i < ζk)
= Φ(α3Si + Xiβ3 − ζk−1;σ2
ν) − Φ(α3Si + Xiβ3 − ζk;σ2
ν) (4)
We estimate the model described by (4) in the complete sample of students but adding a
caste dummy to matrix Xi which is equal to one when the student is from the general group. If
the coeﬃcient for caste in vector β3 turns out to be positive and signiﬁcant, we argue that there
is some evidence in favor of discrimination against SC/ST graduates in terms of occupation.
Table 3 presents the results for discrimination without controlling for the endogeneity of
major choice, as well as the results that rely on propensity scores and joint estimation of (4)-
(1) to control for selection. When selection into selective majors is ignored, the results from
an ordered probit indicate that initial performance, as measured by the ﬁrst year CGPA, has
an important positive eﬀect on the probability of getting better jobs. Being from the general
group also seems to have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the type of jobs EEI graduates
get. Even after controlling for selection in observables and unobservables, general students get
placed in better occupations relative to comparable SC/ST students but the eﬀect of grades on
job type vanishes. It is worth noting that major selectivity and father’s education turn out to
have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on job type that persists after controlling for selection in
unobservables. In sum, although there are no earnings diﬀerentials by caste within occupations,
the evidence shows that minority students tend to start their labor market experience in less
lucrative occupations which are also less likely to oﬀer professional development opportunities.30
29We order them according to the average wages by occupation in our data.
30Notice that the estimated ρ is negative, which implies that students who have higher shocks in the selection
equation also have lower shocks in the type of job equation. In other words, students who prefer more selective
31Table 3: Occupational Discrimination
Ordereda PSb Joint
Probit Estimationc
Selective Major 0.194 0.170 1.089***
(0.131) (0.136) (0.365)
GE 1.757*** 1.883*** 1.888***
(0.208) (0.280) (0.202)
Male 0.097 0.072 0.040
(0.172) (0.176) (0.173)
Dual degree/Master 0.132 0.068 -0.009
(0.126) (0.158) (0.139)
CGPA First Year (CGPA1) 0.127** 0.058 -0.021
(0.055) (0.115) (0.083)
Household Income (base: < 3 lac)
[3 − 6] lac 0.001 -0.030 -0.064
(0.117) (0.126) (0.119)
> 6 lac 0.022 -0.028 -0.084
(0.167) (0.183) (0.171)
Father’s Education (base: High School or less)
College or Technical Training 0.252 0.312* 0.356**
(0.158) (0.182) (0.159)
Grad Education 0.183 0.220 0.244
(0.173) (0.181) (0.171)
School Type (base: Public)
KV/Minority -0.068 -0.036 -0.003
(0.243) (0.248) (0.243)




Observations 451 451 451
Log likelihood -621.3 -621.1 -831.1
ρ -0.535**
Source: Survey data from the EEI’s graduating class, 2008.




a Coeﬃcient on observed major choice in a ordered probit model.
b Propensity score included as control in ordered probit model.
c Joint estimation of selective major choice and type of job equations, no instruments.
majors also prefer worse jobs. This is potentially driven by students in selective majors who prefer to work in
academic jobs instead of highly paid jobs in the private sector.
326 Conclusion
AA policies always generate divided opinions and provoke intense debate. In the U.S., for exam-
ple, evidence showing that AA policies have only beneﬁted richer black students has promoted
proposals to shift from race-based to economic-based aﬃrmative action. This paper oﬀers evi-
dence that can contribute to the debate on reservation policies in higher education admissions
in India by analyzing the real impact of such policies on their intended beneﬁciaries.
Using detailed data on the 2008 graduating class from an elite engineering institution (EEI)
in India and applicant data on students taking the joint entrance exam for engineering colleges
in 2009, this article tries to cast some light on the eﬀects of AA on Indian minorities. Our paper
is particularly relevant because it overcomes the limitations of U.S. studies. First, admission
criteria are clear and rigid so that performance in the entrance exam is all that matters to get
into the EEI in contrast to the much more nebulous admissions process in the U.S. Moreover, the
use of AA policies in India results in very large diﬀerences in admission standards, which implies
that our empirical results are unlikely to be confounded by the program being a marginal one.
Finally, the strict curricula in higher education Indian institutions minimizes the issue of self
selection into easier courses within a major so that grades are a better indicator of performance.
We provide some basic evidence on three issues central to the debate over AA: targeting,
catch up, and mismatch. We also oﬀer some basic evidence on discrimination. We ﬁnd that
minority admission preferences seem to be doing a reasonable job targeting poorer populations,
though there seems to be little evidence of catch up. In fact, minority students in more selective
majors seem to be falling behind, suggesting that mismatch eﬀects might be present. Finally,
we ﬁnd no eﬀect of major selectivity on wages for minority students when only observables are
assumed to drive selection into selective majors. However, when the eﬀect of unobservables
is taken into account, the results suggest that minority students do not beneﬁt from being
in selective majors to which they are attracted by the preferences. In fact, SC/ST students
in selective majors earn less than minority students in less selective majors, supporting the
mismatch hypothesis. Although there are no earnings diﬀerentials by caste within occupations,
minority students seem to be placed in worse occupations than general students.
As Rothstein and Yoon (2008) point out, the pervasive nature of aﬃrmative action policies
33eliminates the possibility of ﬁnding a control group for the minorities beneﬁted by the policy.
Rothstein and Yoon (2009) argue that much of the existing evidence on catch up and mismatch is
ﬂawed since diﬀerences in the control groups chosen have been an important source of variation
across studies. One of our planned extensions is to develop a structural model that can help us
overcome a diﬃculty faced by most empirical studies on the topic: ﬁnding a control group.
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36A Appendix A: Pattern of missing observations
Table A.1: Summary Statistics
% Missing Original Dataset Imputed Dataset
Variable (N=453) Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Male 0.0 0.90 0.90
General Category 0.0 0.85 0.85
First year CGPA 0.0 7.20 1.17 7.20 1.17
CGPA at graduation 0.0 7.40 1.03 7.40 1.03
Bachelor’s degree (Dual/Master’s = 0) 0.0 0.79 0.79
Major
CS 0.0 0.13 0.13
ME 0.0 0.20 0.20
EE 0.0 0.17 0.17
CH 0.0 0.13 0.13
BB 0.0 0.05 0.05
MT 0.0 0.04 0.04
PH 0.0 0.06 0.06
TT 0.0 0.09 0.09
CE 0.0 0.12 0.12









Number of household members 2.4 2.22 0.75 2.25 0.82
Enter the EEI in ﬁrst attempt 3.1 0.49 0.49
Father’s occupation 3.5
Non main earner - retired 0.05 0.08
Government or public sector 0.54 0.52
Private sector 0.42 0.40
Mother’s occupation 3.5
Non main earner - house wife 0.71 0.72
Government or public sector 0.17 0.17
Private sector 0.12 0.11
Father’s education 5.3
Middle school or less 0.04 0.09




Middle school or less 0.11 0.14
(continues)
37(continuation)
% Missing Original Dataset Imputed Dataset
Variable (N=453) Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
High school 0.16 0.16
College 0.36 0.35
Post-graduate 0.36 0.35
First wage after graduation (lac) 10.0












Source: Survey data from the EEI’s graduating class, 2008.
38B Appendix B: Multiple Random Imputation
Allison (2001) proposes multiple imputation methods as an alternative to maximum likelihood
function methods. Like maximum likelihood, multiple imputation estimates are consistent and
asymptotically normal and close to being asymptotically eﬃcient. In addition, multiple imputa-
tion has two big advantages over maximum likelihood: i) it can be applied to any kind of data
or model and ii) the imputation procedure can be implemented using conventional software.
Since imputed values are random draws, the major disadvantage of multiple imputation is that
it produces diﬀerent imputed databases every time you use it.
The most widely-used method for multiple imputation is the Markov Chain Monte Carlo
algorithm based on linear regression. However, in the case of the EEI data, important com-
plications arise from the fact that some of the missing variables are categorical. The Monte
Carlo method presumes that every variable with missing data is normally distributed and that
is clearly not the case for categorical variables. An alternative approach is known as “sequential
generalized regression” or “multiple imputation for chained equations” (MICE). Instead of as-
suming a single multivariate model for all the data, this method speciﬁes a separate regression
model for each variable which is used to impute missing values. This method is thus ﬂexible and
allows us to incorporate logistic, binomial, or multinomial models for categorical variables.31
Each model is estimated sequentially using available data, starting with the variable that
has the fewest missing data and proceeding to the variable with the most missing data. After
each model is estimated, the parameter estimates are used to generate imputed values. Once
imputed values have been generated for all the missing data, the sequential imputation process
is repeated, except now the imputed values of the previous round are used as predictors for
imputing other variables. The main drawback of sequential generalized regressions is that no
theory guarantees convergence to the correct distribution for the missing values. However,
simulation based evidence in Van Buuren et al. (2006) suggests that the method works well.
The MICE method is implemented in the following way:
1. For each dependent variable to be imputed, choose a model that reﬂects the type of data.
2. First round: Imputation starts with dependent variable with the fewest missing data and
proceeds to dependent variable with the most missing data.
• Order dependent variables according to amount of missing data from Y1 to Yk. Denote
variables with complete data values as X.
• Regress Y1 on X and obtain b β and b V (b β). Generate imputed values using observed
covariates and coeﬃcients drawn from N(b β,b V (b β)).
• Regress Y2 on X and Y1 (including imputed values of Y1) and obtain imputed values.
• Continue until all regression models have been estimated.
3. Second and subsequent rounds repeat the process, but each variable is regressed on all
other variables, using imputed values from previous rounds.
4. Process ends when stable imputed values are reached or after a speciﬁed number of rounds.
31See Allison (2001).
39C Appendix C: Additional Tables and Figures
Table C.1: Average First Year CGPA by Major and Caste
Major Total GE SC/ST
Bachelor’s
Computer Science 8.20 8.56 6.65
Electrical Engineering, Power 7.70 8.03 6.37
Mechanical Engineering, Production 7.39 7.72 5.59
Electrical Engineering 7.32 7.74 5.99
Mechanical Engineering 7.26 7.57 5.50
Civil Engineering 6.94 6.94
Engineering Physics 6.89 6.90 6.44
Chemical Engineering 6.75 7.19 5.31
Textile Technology 6.69 7.01 5.19
Dual degree
Computer Science 8.09 8.21 6.79
Electrical Engineering 7.26 7.31 6.50
Chemical Engineering 7.20 7.36 5.25
Biotechnology 6.92 7.08 5.48
Mathematics and Computing (Master’s) 6.45 6.54 5.87
Source: Survey data from the EEI’s graduating class, 2008.













Household Income (base: < 3 lac)
[3 − 9] lac 0.167
(0.107)
> 9 lac 0.194
(0.149)
Household Income x Caste
[3 − 9] lac x SC/ST -0.349
(0.271)
> 9 lac x SC/ST 1.367***
(0.516)
Father’s Education (base: High School or less)




School Type (base: Public)






Source: Survey data from the EEI’s graduating class, 2008.










Constant 1.060*** 1.205*** 1.012***
(0.133) (0.196) (0.166)
Selective Major 0.185*** 0.176*** 0.115
(0.036) (0.037) (0.149)
Male -0.032 -0.048 -0.027
(0.043) (0.046) (0.045)
Dual degree/Master -0.013 -0.041 -0.002
(0.032) (0.042) (0.040)
CGPA First Year 0.043* 0.020 0.056
(0.025) (0.035) (0.036)
CGPA at Graduation 0.033 0.033 0.028
(0.028) (0.028) (0.030)
Household Income (base: < 3 lac)
[3 − 6] lac 0.055* 0.043 0.060*
(0.029) (0.031) (0.031)
> 6 lac 0.129*** 0.112** 0.137***
(0.043) (0.046) (0.046)
Father’s Education (base: High School or less)
College or Technical Training 0.045 0.078 0.032
(0.040) (0.052) (0.049)
Grad Education 0.009 0.034 -0.001
(0.043) (0.050) (0.048)
School Type (base: Public)
KV/Minority 0.160*** 0.164*** 0.160***
(0.057) (0.058) (0.058)
Private 0.144*** 0.136*** 0.148***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.040)
Type of job (base: Non-technical)
Core 0.069* 0.071* 0.068*
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Management/Consulting 0.021 0.024 0.021
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Analytical 0.058 0.057 0.058
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046)






Observations 383 383 383
σ 0.203 0.203 0.204
Source: Survey data from the EEI’s graduating class, 2008.




a Coeﬃcient on observed major choice in an interval regression for wages.
b Propensity score included as control in interval regression for wages.
c Joint estimation of selective major choice and wages equations, no instruments.






Constant 1.247*** 1.459*** 0.830*
(0.370) (0.392) (0.497)
Selective Major 0.055 -0.001 -0.380*
(0.085) (0.093) (0.199)
Male -0.174 -0.092 -0.331*
(0.136) (0.148) (0.182)
Dual degree/Master -0.155 -0.144 -0.159
(0.112) (0.109) (0.125)
CGPA First Year 0.046 -0.010 0.172
(0.070) (0.080) (0.106)
CGPA at Graduation 0.056 0.049 0.053
(0.077) (0.075) (0.092)
Household Income (base: < 3 lac)
[3 − 6] lac -0.102 -0.115 -0.069
(0.078) (0.077) (0.095)
> 6 lac -0.195 -0.223 -0.136
(0.158) (0.157) (0.199)
Father’s Education (base: High School or less)
College or Technical Training 0.001 -0.005 0.004
(0.074) (0.073) (0.093)
Grad Education -0.001 -0.024 0.037
(0.092) (0.092) (0.116)
School Type (base: Public)
KV/Minority or Private
Type of job (base: Non-technical) 0.098 0.132* 0.028













Observations 68 68 68
σ 0.219 0.215 0.289
Source: Survey data from the EEI’s graduating class, 2008.




a Coeﬃcient on observed major choice in an interval regression for wages.
b Propensity score included as control in interval regression for wages.
c Joint estimation of selective major choice and wages equations, no instruments.
43Table C.5: Well-being as a Function of Relative Academic Disadvantage and Controls
Stressed Depressed Lonely Discriminated Hostel feels
like home
Selective Major 0.005 -0.114 -0.161** -0.106* 0.003
(0.089) (0.075) (0.071) (0.060) (0.077)
Male -0.072 -0.024 0.012 0.003 -0.115
(0.081) (0.070) (0.067) (0.054) (0.076)
Dual degree/Master 0.047 0.064 0.079* 0.038 0.025
(0.060) (0.049) (0.047) (0.037) (0.054)
CGPA First Year (CGPA1) 0.120 0.078 0.158** 0.035 -0.061
(0.082) (0.068) (0.066) (0.053) (0.072)
GE 0.069 -0.076 0.193 0.020 -0.046
(0.136) (0.105) (0.136) (0.093) (0.126)
(CGPA1 - Major’s mean CGPA1) -0.194* -0.103 -0.296*** -0.095 0.099
(0.113) (0.090) (0.097) (0.073) (0.101)
GE x (CGPA1 - Major’s mean CGPA1) -0.012 -0.032 0.052 0.021 -0.052
(0.091) (0.070) (0.083) (0.059) (0.080)
Household Income (base: < 3 lac)
[3 − 6] lac -0.016 -0.040 0.026 0.025 -0.020
(0.053) (0.043) (0.042) (0.034) (0.047)
> 6 lac 0.046 -0.016 -0.052 0.039 -0.115*
(0.076) (0.063) (0.065) (0.049) (0.063)
Father’s Education (base: High School or less)
College or Technical Training 0.080 0.005 -0.024 0.039 0.003
(0.069) (0.055) (0.055) (0.047) (0.060)
Grad Education -0.005 -0.033 0.050 0.043 -0.001
(0.076) (0.061) (0.059) (0.051) (0.066)
School Type (base: Public)
KV/Minority -0.096 -0.018 -0.174* 0.027 -0.025
(0.100) (0.079) (0.094) (0.053) (0.082)
Private 0.029 0.026 -0.031 -0.040 -0.007
(0.066) (0.053) (0.052) (0.039) (0.056)
Observations 422 413 420 412 425
Log likelihood -270.5 -194.5 -189.4 -128.8 -226.0
Source: Survey data from the EEI’s graduating class, 2008.




44D Appendix D: 2009 Entrance Exam Applicant Data
In general, Figure D.1 shows that there are greater concentrations of exam applicants in north
eastern areas, especially in richer districts. Moreover, central regions of the country with higher
urban poverty rates are contributing less to the applicant pool. Although this evidence is
suggestive, we need to take into account the population “at risk” of taking the exam in each
district to check if certain district characteristics are related to a relatively higher proportion
of high school graduates taking the entrance exam. We approximate the probability of taking
the entrance exam in a given district as the number of 2009 applicants from a given PIN code
divided by the number of high school students enroled in grades 9th through 12th in 2006.32
Even though the 2009 applicant data does not contain information about students’ placement,
we code all students who made it into their respective merit list and are ranked above the
maximum number of seats available for their group as admitted students. We can then proxy
the district’s probability of getting into college as the number of admitted students divided by
the total number of applicants from the corresponding PIN code.
Using the results from non-parametric locally linear regressions in the sample of districts
with exam applicants in 2009, Figure D.2 plots districts’ probability of taking the exam and the
probability of getting into college as functions of urban poverty rates, share of rural population
and share SC/ST population. The blue lines in panels (a) and (b) show that both the probability
of taking the college entrance exam and the probability of getting in do not seem to be aﬀected
by the share of minority population in the district. This pattern is particularly interesting if one
takes into account that areas with higher concentrations of SC/ST population tend to have lower
average performance in the entrance exam (both in the aggregate and by subject) as shown in
panel (a), Figure D.3. In the absence of AA policies, the lower prospects of success in the exam
in areas with higher concentrations of minority population would lead to a lower probability of
taking the exam as well as lower chances of being admitted. The fact that we do not identify a
relationship between the district’s share of SC/ST population and the probabilities of writing the
exam or getting in suggests that admission preferences particularly motivate minority students
to take the exam and facilitate their admission into college.
When we order districts by their poverty rate, panel (a) in Figure D.2 shows a modest decline
in the probability of taking the exam as the percentage of urban poor rises. However, the black
line in panel (b) suggests that there is no relationship between the probability of getting in
and poverty. This could be due to preferences for SC/ST who tend to be poorer than the GE
group. The small diﬀerences in the proportion of people getting in may follow from the small
diﬀerences in average performance among poor and rich districts exhibited in panel (b) in Figure
D.3. Finally, the gray lines in panels (a) and (b) in Figure D.2 show that the probability of
taking the exam and the probability of getting into college are both decreasing in the share of
rural population, which reﬂects AA’s lack of focus on rural students.
32The latter comes from the State Proﬁle 2005-06 prepared by the Indian Ministry of Human Resource and
Development. We acknowledge that the total population “at risk”of taking the exam will be overestimated,
especially due to higher dropout in the last years of high school, and more so in poorer districts. Unfortunately,
data for 12th grade enrolment in 2008 was not publicly available at the district level, only at the state level.
45Figure D.1: District-Level Poverty Rate and Number of Exam Applicants
Legend










Source: Centralized Entrance Exam, Applicant data 2009. Poverty rates from and Chakravarty and
Somanathan (2008).
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Source: Centralized Entrance Exam, Applicant data 2009.
Note: Probabilities are locally mean-smoothed using a kernel-weighted local polynomial smoother.
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Source: Centralized Entrance Exam, Applicant data 2009.
Note: Average Marks in panel (a) are locally mean-smoothed using a kernel-weighted local polynomial smoother.
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